If the meeting between Mas and Rajoy ends up taking place, each of the two presidents will arrive sheltered by a completely different type of political power and argument. Rajoy will go confident of being in control (from top to bottom) of the State’s machinery. Mas will attend as the representative of an independence movement that he heads and even leads, but does not control. The Catalan president will brandish the existence of a country that has mobilized itself to demand a consultation that would allow for the channeling of the people in a civilized way, thus avoiding loss of popular control of any type. The Spanish president will attempt to use this same reality to create a wall that, in just a few months, may divide the independence movement and leave Mas on the sidelines.
The PP’s absolute majority accounts for only part of the Spanish president’s power. His public image (in television interviews, parliamentary responses, and political rallies), essentially mediocre, appears to hide an indisputable political skill. In two and a half years Rajoy has neutralized the main alternative candidates within the PP (Aguirre and Ruiz-Gallardón). He has driven out the director of newspaper El Mundo, spearhead of the Bárcenas scandal, and has reinforced his control over the main media outlets (in Madrid and in Barcelona). He has allowed his Valencian allies, who were essential within the PP in overcoming the defeat of 2008, to fall. He has contained Aznarism and its direct intervention solutions for Catalonia. He has liquidated the wild and undisciplined right wing of Vidal-Quadras. He has retired the king, who, as father of the Transition in the national mythology, appeared to enjoy an impregnable position. And, contrary to the expectations of the more charitable voices in Catalonia, he has only needed a single public warning (via the vice-president), to reduce King Felipe to a Scandinavian-style figurehead monarch--; of course, in exchange for top-of-the-range legal immunity.
It is clear that, in addition to deriving from a Machiavellian political virtue, Rajoy’s strength (clad in gray) rests on a good dose of luck. While the Spanish president was devouring the right wing, the left imploded: Felipe-ism, sitting on the board of directors of companies closely affiliated with the State, is no longer seen as a credible means to regenerate Spain; the populism of Podemos is forcing the PSOE to turn to the left and leave the political center unattended. With its electorate located in the subsidized regions, any offer by the PSOE to Catalonia is pure theatrics and, therefore, it makes the PSC (and the PSOE) even more irrelevant.
Faced with this scenario full of political cadavers of all types, the issue of Catalan independence is the big -perhaps the only- hurdle endangering Rajoy’s process of expansion (the driving force in all politics). The hurdle appears, and is, in good part, formidable, precisely because the adversary, the Catalan president, cannot be eliminated. To abandon the consultation is unthinkable. To renegotiate the terms of the question, extremely difficult. At most, Mas could reinforce the legality of the question: for example, by adding the phrase "Do you authorize the Catalan Parliament to negotiate (or to reform the Constitution) to make the result of the referendum possible?" In a word, a wise Spanish politician would have to accept the consultation in order to avoid the risk of civil disobedience.
Surprisingly, Rajoy’s stand is, at least for now, a different one. That is, to oblige Mas, faced with the refusal of the Spanish government to accept the consultation, to choose between the supporters of holding an election instead, or the advocates of forging ahead with the consultation, no matter the circumstances. And to nurture this division between moderates and radicals so that it emerges and intensifies to the point of weakening Mas, and thus recover the control of the political tempo (that Rajoy has administered so well up until now, at least outside Catalonia).
The danger of division (for ideological and personal reasons, and because knowing how to predict the future is very difficult) between supporters of the consultation and advocates of elections is real and must be addressed with intelligence. Firstly, by insisting on the consultation: now is not the time to suggest alternatives. Secondly, by coming up with forms of civic pressure that, beyond the consultation or elections, could become fundamental in bringing about the change. Thirdly, forming a coalition government of pro-consultation parties (under the watchful eyes of a well-organized civil society that must remain an independent arbiter). This government would have to be one of equals. CiU and ERC would drive the process together --not by sharing out second-level ministries but, rather, with either a presidency or a vice-presidency (or an advisor of the highest level reporting directly to the presidency) for either party. The government should be formed after September 11 and before (or at the same time as) the calling of the consultation, and would last until the completion of the political transition. Naturally, this means that all parties must begin to negotiate the terms of the agreement right now.
