The Catalan consultation of November 9th (or 9N as it is commonly referred to) can be summarized in four lessons. First, the level of popular mobilization was a big success despite –and this must be stressed once again– the lack of an institutional campaign, official support, and any assurance, even on the eve of the vote, that the consultation would actually take place. It's true that some have rushed to interpret the turnout (around forty percent of voters once non-citizen votes –which were minimal– are excluded) and the proportion of "yes-yes" ballots as falling short by about 300,000 to 400,000 votes needed to get a pro-independence majority. But this ignores the fact that the fundamental virtue of 9N was not simply "to do a head count" (for that we already have surveys that predict a majority –albeit a slim one– in favor of independence), but to publicize and congeal a nation able to work together, to go to the voting places and to vote without any externally-imposed restrictions. Secondly, the November 9th consultation confirmed once more both the role of the people as the driver of the sovereignty movement and the fact that, for years now, Catalan politicians, without exception, have only acted as executors of the people's mandate. No one person can take credit for the success of 9N: the best part of that memorable day was the feeling that everyone who participated did so because they were driven by a personal civic force, free of any party discipline. Thirdly, 9N has transformed the limits of what is possible, changing the relationship between the Spanish State and Catalonia, and legitimizing an "alegal" event that sets a precedent for other strictly pro-sovereignty acts and decisions. Finally, it has had an extraordinary impact internationally, both in terms of media coverage (measured by the number of articles and editorials) and for its effectiveness in explaining to the world that independence is a solution that has gradually emerged after Catalans have exhausted all other alternatives to live within Spain.
In turn, the results of 9N open up three questions: Are early elections needed? Should they take place with a single electoral list combining all pro-independence parties? And, regardless of the answer to the latter question, what is the program that should be followed?
We know that –in all likelihood– there will be a complete change on the Spanish political stage in the next twelve months. In the spring municipal elections, the PP will be heavily punished by voters: for example, a recent survey has the PP losing all the provincial capitals in Andalusia. After the general elections next fall the Spanish parliament will be likely to be divided into three blocs: the PP, PSOE, and Podemos. No constitutional reform will come out of that legislature: constitutional amendments involving any fundamental institutional changes require a two-thirds majority in the Spanish Cortes, hence enabling a future PP minority to block it. From the standpoint of governance, the most likely outcome would be a minority government, with the PSOE as the pivotal party receiving the tacit support of one of the other two parties. In that context, Catalan representatives would be absolutely irrelevant and unable to bargain any kind of real political deal with Spain. In short, although Spanish politicians may try to promise some kind of constitutional reform, they will be unable to make any relevant substantial concessions. In fact, the fragmentation and polarization of the legislature will do nothing except intensify the political and economic crisis in Spain –a situation that can only harm Catalonia, if it decides not to break with the status quo.
Given this set of conditions, holding the Catalan election after the Spanish general elections appears to be a mistake. It would break with the existing mandate of the people (the single driving force behind 9N), and would, most importantly, cloud the clarity of the current political dilemma –independence: yes or no– because it would allow part of the Catalan political elite (that which is still living in the pre-9N reality) to justify delaying the final decision by pretending that Spain has changed and it is able to offer something new.
If the early election is held before the municipal elections, the most logical solution is to have a unified candidacy. To hold elections simply for the sake of changing the leadership of the national transition (while maintaining the transition) doesn't make much sense. However, taking into account the egos and the distrust and tensions that exist among Catalan political leaders (with one side considering the other party too radical and rigid, and with the latter believing that the former will end up embracing a middle path, and, therefore, demanding a fully specified contract), the only way out is for the large civic organizations in the country to oversee the formation of the unified candidacy –integrating the leading figures from the principal parties followed by members of civilian society. This should also be done with a program, relatively flexible in its execution, but inspired by the proposal of the CATN (1) (a declaration followed by a negotiating period with a deadline, leading up to a proclamation of independence) and open to the possibility of applying, among other things, the strategy of civil disobedience, employed by 2.5 million citizens on 9N, to the spring of 2015 income tax campaign.
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(1) N.T. Advisory Council for National Transition
